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Abstract: In this article a multi-zonal integrated energy-reserve market model is proposed.
Bidders in this model may submit their demand and supply bids on the one hand in the form
of conventional hourly step bids and block bids, which are cleared and paid according to
market clearing prices (MCPs). On the other hand, suppliers may submit so called flexible
production bids, while both suppliers and consumers may submit fill-or-kill type package-
priced combined bids – these bids are accepted if their acceptance implies an improvement
in the resulting total social welfare, which the market clearing algorithm aims to optimize.
The model includes network constraints for the nominal case (if no reserves are activated)
and also for perturbed cases when the allocated reserves are activated.
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1 Introduction
The most important aim of European-type day-ahead electricity markets is to har-
monize power demand and supply in a way, which in ideal case results in the highest
possible social welfare (SW). The concept of SW basically originates from the ’pay
as clear’ principle [1]. In the most simple framework for electricity market clearing,
supply and demand bids are submitted for a single period of the trading interval,
each bid being described by two parameters, the bid quantity and the bid price per
unit (PPU). In the case of demand bids, the product of the bid quantity and the PPU
describes the willingness to pay for the required quantity, while in the case of supply
bids, the same product corresponds to the minimal required income for the offered
amount (usually assumed to be equal to the cost of the production). The market is
cleared according to the so called market clearing price (MCP): Demand bids with
bid PPU lower than the MCP will be rejected, as well as supply bids with bid PPU
higher than the MCP. Bids whose PPU is equal to the MCP may be also partially
accepted.
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Bids are paid for according to the MCP, which means that the bidder, e.g. in the
case of an accepted demand bid, pays less for the required quantity compared to his
willingness to pay (and similarly, supply bidders receive potentially more payment
for accepted supply bids). This surplus, which is the product of the difference be-
tween the bid PPU and the MCP and the bid quantity, is called the social welfare
(SW) of the bid [1]. The total social welfare (TSW) of a dispatch is the sum of SW
values corresponding to single bids, and may be represented as the area between the
supply and the demand curve as depicted in Fig. 1.
Figure 1
Social welfare of single bids in the one-period market model. Si and Di correspond to supply and
demand bids, while MCP stands for the market clearing price.
In the simple one-period example depicted in Fig. 1, the maximization of TSW is
trivial: The MCP is determined from the intersection of supply and demand curves
(this will ensure the energy balance), and clear the market according to this MCP. In
general case however, nonconvexities originating from special bid types (see later
)make the problem complex. On the other hand, multiple price zones connected with
transmission lines may be present. In this case the energy balance is not required for
every single price zone, but it must hold for the total system, while the transmission
constraints of the connecting lines must be taken into account [2].
In addition, operators of the power system have to ensure the stability and security.
In the current setup, it is assumed that the central authority operates the market with
regard to the transmission system as well - in line with this, the terminology of
independent system operator (ISO) is used throughout the paper.
Stability refers to frequency stability [3] or voltage stability [4], while security refers
to e.g. n-1 line and node contingency, which means that if one of the lines or one
of the nodes of the network fails instantly, the resulting flows may not overload any
of the remaining lines [5]. The stability of frequency is dependent on the supply-
demand balance: If consumers or suppliers deviate from their predefined schedule,
and thus cause imbalance, the ISO activates previously allocated (positive or nega-
tive) reserves at generating units to restore the balance.
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These reserves practically mean rights for the ISO to give orders to generating units
to increase or decrease actual generation values. In most of the countries where a
liberalized electricity trade takes place, separate markets were created for the allo-
cation of such and other reserves, called altogether ancillary services [6].
Joint (or integrated) energy and reserve markets are representing a concept, where
the allocation of power and reserve to generating units takes place not on disjoint
markets, but in one integrated auction [7].
One main benefit of integrated markets is described in [8] as: ’co-optimization en-
ables the participants to achieve more surplus by providing an efficient way to sub-
mit all possible combinations of energy-reserve allocation to the market. There-
fore the risk of precommitting generating capacity to sequential offers of different
products and clearing can be eliminated’. The paper [9] formulates a similar con-
sideration as ’Since distinct reserve services can in fact be strongly coupled, and
the heuristics required to bridge the various sequential markets can ultimately lead
to loss of social welfare, simultaneous energy/reserves market-clearing procedures
have been proposed and are in use. However, they generally schedule reserve ser-
vices subject to exogenous rules and parameters that do not relate to actual operat-
ing conditions’.
The paper [9] proposes a security constrained simultaneous clearing of energy and
reserve services with a perturbation approach similar to the one proposed in the cur-
rent paper. The supply side in [9] is also formulated in a unit-commitment spirit.
The approach of the paper [10] is similar, it also proposes that at any given network
bus all scheduled reserve types should be priced not at separate rates but at a com-
mon rate equal to the marginal cost of security at that bus. The papers [11, 12] use
a multiobjective mathematical programming (MMP) approach including MCPs as
well in the formulation.
While several results have been already published in the field of integrated markets,
the presented approaches usually are driven by the unit-commitment spirit of North
American market models, where the generating units are not self-scheduling. A not
self-scheduling clearing means that generating units submit technical characteristics
and production costs to the ISO who determines production profiles and reserve
allocations according to these parameters.
In European type markets, the self-scheduling generating units may bid with a va-
riety of products, and act like more active market participants [13]. An approach
for co-optimizing power and reserve allocation which is motivated by this type of
power market is described in the articles [8, 14, 15].
The main aim of the current paper is to provide a possible framework for multi-
node integrated markets, but in contrast to the cost minimization approach used e.g.
in [16], the proposed concept aims to maximize the total social welfare (SW).
In the day-ahead market, where the clearing is determined for 24 consecutive hours,
technological considerations of generating units imply further challenges (in inte-
grated and conventional markets as well). Startup costs and minimal operating loads
are the most common sources of non-convexities, but also minimal up and down
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times can be considered. These non-convexities are usually handled by the intro-
duction of block orders, which may be rejected or accepted in a binary manner (no
partial acceptance is allowed), thus the representative variables in the clearing are
binary.
An approach to represent the constant and variable costs (corresponding to start-up
and production respectively) of generating units is the concept of minimum income
condition (MIC) orders [17–20]. As described in [19], ’minimum income orders are
supply orders consisting of several hourly step bids for potentially different market
hours, and they are bound together by the MIC which prescribes that the overall
income of the MIC order must cover its given costs’. The efficient clearing of such
bids is described in [20]. In this framework, generation costs corresponding to this
type of bid are zero if the bid is rejected, otherwise they are considered with a fixed
and a linear variable term which are determined by the bidder. Incomes in the case
of the proposed MIC bid can be expressed as the product of accepted quantities and
MCPs. In this concept, since the elements of the MIC bids are standard hourly step
bids, the generation profile of the unit submitting the MIC bid is fully determined
by the MCPs.
In this paper a somewhat different approach is proposed, namely the concept of
flexible production bids (shortly FP bids) and combined bids is introduced. Flexible
production bids are formed in the spirit of unit commitment: The production values
for the single periods are determined by the ISO during the clearing, considering
the technical and cost parameters of the unit. Technical parameters are the load
gradient constraints, while the cost parameters are the start-up and variable cost
values. Combined bids in contrast hold fixed quantities of power and reserve and
are cleared and paid as a whole package if accepted.
In addition, the coupling of combined power-reserve markets is also considered,
which means that transmission constraints are formulated on nominal flows and
also on flows originating from the activation of reserves are.
The proposed framework may be also considered as a kind of transition between
European and US type markets in the sense that on the one hand conventional price-
quantity (step) bids are submitted, and on the other hand generating units may also
submit generation characteristics in the form of FP bids, in which case their power
and reserve allocation will be scheduled by the ISO. In addition, participants may
also submit fixed-price combined bids, which represent basically pay-as-bid type
bids.
Since the problem formulation in itself is a complex challenge (even if one considers
only ’conventional’ coupling of integrated markets without innovative bid types),
this paper presents only the important concepts of the formulation.
2 The Market Model
The basis of the proposed framework is a standard uniform price (European type)
multi-node (or in other words zonal) electricity market model with T time periods
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(see e.g. the basic structure in [1]).
In the current paper only reserves corresponding to frequency control (more pre-
cisely secondary reserves) are considered. It is assumed that reserve-providing units
are paid for the allocation of reserve capacities, in other words in the current model
it is not taken into account if reserves are activated or not.
2.1 Bid Types in the Model
We suppose in the following that one period of the model corresponds to one hour.
2.1.1 One Hour Bids
One-hour single-product bids These bids are the principal elements of the mar-
ket model. They describe demand or supply of a single product (power, positive or
negative reserve) in a single time period, and their acceptance is independent of the
acceptance of bids regarding other time periods.
It can be assumed that most bids are submitted in this format to the market. These
bids are characterized by a quantity (B), by the index of the time period in which
the bid is relevant (t) and a respective price (per unit), denoted by Θ.
Such one-hour bids are cleared according to MCPs denoted by ϕPi (t), ϕ
Rp
i (t) and
ϕRni (t) corresponding to power, positive and negative reserve respectively in each
node i, regarding the respective time period t. If the resulting MCP is equal PPU
of a bid, the partial acceptance of the bid is allowed, formally the bid acceptance
indicator y is ∈ [0,1] in this case.
2.1.2 Multiple Period Bids
Multiple period bids may include more than one periods as well, but must be taken
into account and cleared as a single bid.
Block bids In the used terminology, block bids refer to a single product (power
or reserve) bids, which includes multiple (consecutive) time periods. It is assumed
that block bids have the fill-or-kill property, in the sense that either the total of-
fered quantity is either fully accepted for all respective time periods, or the bid is
completely rejected.
These bids are characterized by quantities for the corresponding hours (B – a vector
in this case), by the indices of the time periods in which the bid is relevant (t) and
the respective PPUs, denoted by Θ (also a vector). Although in the practice the
bid quantities and PPUs usually are the same for every period of the bid, the vector
formulation allows potentially different quantities and PPUs for each period.
The acceptance constraint in the case of block bids is that the resulting total SW must
be positive [21]. The total SW of a block bid is the sum of the SWs corresponding
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to the included time periods. Block bids are very common in electricity markets and
they are discussed e.g. in [21, 22].
Remark: Standard bids In the used terminology, standard bids mean to 1-hour
single-product bids or block bids. As the acceptance of such bids is explicitly deter-
mined by MCPs, they are distinguished from the bid types described in the follow-
ing,
Flexible production bids Flexible production or FP bids are suited for generat-
ing units who practically offer their generating capacity in a unit-commitment type
offer. Upon the acceptance of such bids, the ISO assigns nonzero power and reserve
amounts to units submitting these bids for each period included in the bid, accord-
ing to the actual needs of the market. These bids are characterized in the proposed
model by start-up cost (α), variable cost (β ) and ramp constraints (RU for ramp-up
and RD for ramp-down). The maximal possible amount of assigned reserve is deter-
mined by the assigned power production profile and by the ramp constraints (e.g. if
in two consecutive periods the output of the unit according to the power production
profile is increased with RU , no positive reserve may be assigned to it).
If an FP bid is accepted, the generating unit is paid off according to produced quan-
tities (determined by the ISO) and respective MCPs, and its income must cover the
reported expenses of generation, derived from start-up and variable costs. The for-
mulation of last consideration may be viewed as a variant of the so called minimum
income condition (MIC) [18, 19, 23].
Example 1 In the following, the concept of FP bids is demonstrated using a sim-
ple 2 period example. The set of standard (in this case only 1-hour) bids is as
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Standard bids in of example 1 (the upper index in the bid ID refers to the period)
bid ID relevant period quantity (B) PPU (Θ)
D11 1 15 90
D12 1 20 80
S11 1 27 75
S12 1 13 85
D21 2 15 90
D22 2 20 80
S21 2 27 75
S22 2 13 85
It can be seen in Table 1 that the standard bids are the same for hour 1 and 2, thus
they imply the supply-demand curves depicted in Fig. 2 for both hours.
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Figure 2
Supply-demand curves of example 1
First, one may consider the scenario where no other bids are present. In this case,
the dispatch calculation is very simple: The MCP (denoted by ϕ) is determined by
the intersection of the curves (ϕ=80): D1 and S1 will be fully accepted while D2
will be partially accepted. The social welfare of the demand and supply side in each
period may be calculated as:
SW D = (90−80)15 = 150 SW S = (80−75)27 = 135
thus the total social welfare equals to 285 for each period thus T SW=570.
On the other hand, one can assume a scenario, when in addition to the standard bids,
an FP bid is also present with the parameters α = 3000, β = 28 (we can assume that
RU and RD are arbitrary positive values).
What happens, if ϕ = 72 for both periods? According to the MCP, the standard
supply bids will be rejected (as their PPU is higher than the MCP), while both
demand bids will be fully accepted, resulting in the social welfare
SW D = (90−72)15+(80−72)20 = 430
for both periods. Regarding the supply side, the unit corresponding to the FP bid has
to produce 35 MW in each period. The cost of the production of the FP bid may be
calculated as α+2β35= 4960, while the income of the FP bid is 35 ·72 ·2= 5040.
The income of the bid covers the production cost (which is a necessary condition for
the acceptance of the FP bid), and SW S = 80. In this case T SW = 860+80 = 940.
As the T SW is higher in the case of the second scenario (940 vs 570), if the FP bid
is also present in the market, the market clearing algorithm will prefer the second
solution, as it aims to maximize the T SW . In general, in order to maximize the
TSW, the market clearing algorithm has to determine the MCPs and the acceptance
of FP bids simultaneously.
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It can be noted furthermore that the acceptance of the FP bid is not explicitly de-
termined by the MCP: If the PPU of the first and the second supply bid is lowered
to 60 and 72 respectively, and suppose ϕ = 72, both demand bids will be accepted
(while S2 will be partially accepted to ensure the power balance) and this results in
SW D = (90−72)15+(80−72)20 = 430 SW S = (72−60)27 = 324
for each period, resulting in T SW = 1508, a solution clearly preferable compared to
the acceptance of the FP bid.
Regarding the notations corresponding to FP bids in the model, multiple nodes are
considered in general, it is assumed that each FP bid corresponds to a generating unit
in a certain node of the network. Each node may hold multiple generating units, but
not all nodes necessarily hold generating units. Binary variables are used to describe
whether a generating unit operates or not in a given time period. vi j(t) denotes the
activity indicator of unit j of node i at time t. Units are indexed from 1 in each
node. For example if there are 2 units in node 1 and 1 unit in node two, variables
v11(t), v12(t) and v21(t) will represent the activity indicators for each time period t.
With the help of these binary variables, start-up costs, minimal up and down times
and minimal load of units can be described. On the other hand, if the corresponding
activity indicator is 0, the output of the unit is 0 (regarding power, and both types
of reserves as well). Pi j(t) denotes the power production value allocated to unit j
of node i at time t. Regarding reserves, Rpi j(t) and Rni j(t) denote respectively the
positive and negative reserve value allocated to unit j of node i at time t.
Combined bids Combined bids in the proposed framework make possible to sub-
mit bids simultaneously for power and reserve production (or consumption). In the
case of combined bids, the bid holds fixed values of power, positive and negative re-
serves, potentially including multiple time periods. The parameters of this bid type
are the amounts of products offered for the respective time periods, and total price.
The price is not interpreted as per unit in this case, but as a total amount, which shall
be at least paid to the bidder upon acceptance – independent of MCPs. In addition
to this fixed price, to each combined bid a nonnegative surplus is assigned by the
MO (see the details later).
it is assumed that combined bids have the fill-or-kill property and the standard bids
and combined bids are called fixed quantity (FQ) bids (in contrast to FP bids where
the quantity is assigned to the bid by the ISO).
Example 2 A single-period scenario is used to illustrate the concept of combined
bids, where the standard power and reserve bids are as summarized in table 2 (the
power bids define the same supply-demand curves as in Example 1). In the case of
this simple example only one type of reserve is considered (arbitrarily + or -).
Again, it is assumed that no other bids are present. In this case ϕP = 80, ϕR =
45, resulting in SW P = 285 and SW R = 50 (T SW = 335) – the balance is 27 MW
regarding power and 10 MW regarding the reserve.
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bid ID quantity (B) PPU (Θ)
DP1 15 90
DP2 20 80
SP1 27 75
SP2 13 85
DR1 10 50
DR2 10 40
SR1 15 45
Table 2
Standard bids in of example 2 (the upper index refers to power/reserve)
On the other hand, if in addition to the standard bids, also assume a combined bid
offering 15 MW of power and 15 MW of reserve at the price of 1600 is present,
the following dispatch is possible. Regarding the power balance, if ϕP = 75, both
demand bids are accepted resulting in the demand of 35 MW, from which 20 MW
of power is supplied from the first standard supply bid (which is partially accepted),
and the rest from the combined bid.
Regarding the reserve balance, the standard reserve supply bid is rejected, the first
standard reserve demand bid is fully accepted while the second one is partially ac-
cepted. All 15 MWs of reserve are supplied by the accepted combined bid.
Here, two conditions must be checked. First, the total income from demand bids
must cover the total cost of supply. The income from power demand bids is (15+
20)75= 2625, while the income from reserve demand bids is (10+5)40= 600, thus
the total income is 3225. The cost of the standard power supply bid is 75 ·20= 1500,
while the cost of the combined bid is 1600 The total cost is 3100 – the difference
between the total income and the total cost (125) will be assigned to the surplus of
the combined bid in this case.
Second, the T SW must exceed the T SW of the first scenario in order to make the
dispatch more desirable for the clearing algorithm.
SW P = (90−75)15+(80−75)20 = 325 SW R = (50−40)10 = 100 ,
while the SW of the combined bid is equal to its surplus (125), thus T SW = 540 >
335.
2.1.3 Overview of Bids
Fixed quantity and flexible production For all bids (except for FP bids) it may
be calculated how much they will contribute to power and reserve balances upon
their acceptance (partial acceptance is allowed only in the case of one-hour single-
product bids). Thus,these bids are called fixed quantity (FQ) bids. In the proposed
model demand bids are always FQ. The set B collets all FQ bid types, regarding
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the traded product (not distinguishing between one-hour and multiple hour bids).
B = {DP, SP, DRp, SRp, DRn, SRn, DC, SC} (1)
The first letter stands for demand or supply, while the rest stand for power (P), pos-
itive reserve (Rp), negative reserve (Rn) or combined bids (C). These abbreviations
are used through the paper.
Figure 3 summarizes the bid types used through the paper and their properties.
Figure 3
Bid types in the proposed market formulation. P&R stands for power and reserve.
2.2 Clearing of the Market
One may depict the one-hour single product (e.g. power) demand and supply bids
for any particular hour in the standard spot-market fashion like in Fig. 4. By such
an ordering of bids (increasing by PPU in the case of supply and decreasing in the
case of demand), if there are enough bids for the curves to intersect in every hour,
setting the MCPs according to the intersection prices clears the market (in this case
however no block bids, FP bids or combined bids are taken into account, thus all of
such bids are rejected).
On the other hand if the MCP is as depicted in Fig. 4, it can be seen that there
is an imbalance both in the supplied/consumed power (Bd1−Bs1), and regarding
incomes/costs as well. The total income is I1+ I2 = Bd1ϕ while the total cost of the
accepted supply bid is C1 = Bs1ϕ . To put the principle of the clearing very short, the
excess income (summed for all hours) is used to pay for block, FP and combined
bids which cover the hourly power/reserve imbalances (as detailed in Example 1 of
subsection 2.1.2 and depicted in Fig. 2)
The task of the market-clearing algorithm is to find such MCPs, and such scheduling
of FP, block and combined bids (via determination of their scheduling/acceptance
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Figure 4
Power and income/cost imbalances caused by the particular depicted MCP. ϕ stands for the MCP, while
θd and θs denotes the demand and supply bid prices.
variables1), which maximizes the total social welfare, and respects the hourly power
and reserve balance constraints as well as the network bottlenecks.
3 Formalization of the Market Clearing Model
In the current article, the main ideas and the most important corresponding equations
of the proposed concepts are presented. The detailed mathematical formalism of the
optimization problem describing market clearing can be found in the freely available
research report [24] available at arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13466.pdf.
N nodes are assumed in the network. The number of units at node i is denoted by ni,
and it is assumed that each unit submits a FP bid. The total number of units, which
do submit FP bids is denoted by n. mTi denotes the number of bids of type T at node
i. T ∈ {DP,SP,DRp,SRp,DRn,SRn,DC,SC}, where the first letter corresponds to
Demand/supply, and the further letters correspond to power (P), positive (Rp) or
negative (Rn) reserve or combined bids (C). Furthermore, mT = ∑i mTi .
3.1 Model variables
3.1.1 Variables Corresponding to the Clearing of FP Bids
vi j(t) denotes the up indicator of unit j of node i at time t, equals to 1 if unit j
of node i is operating at time period T and zero otherwise. The vector of all such
variables is denoted by v ∈ {0,1}n(T+1). vi j(O) is an auxiliary variable, which is
1 To be more precise, in the case of combined bids, the payoff variables have to be deter-
mined as well
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equal to one if the unit is up in any of the periods in the analyzed time frame (used
for the calculation of start-up costs). The structure of v is detailed in [24].
Pi j(t) denotes the power production value allocated to unit j of node i at time t,
Rpi j(t) denotes the positive reserve allocated to unit j of node i at time t, and Rni j(t)
denotes the negative reserve allocated to unit j of node i at time t. P ∈ {0,1}nT ,
Rp ∈ {0,1}nT , Rn ∈ {0,1}nT . The structure of the vectors P, Rp and Rn is detailed
in [24].
3.1.2 Variables Corresponding to MCPs and Bid Acceptance Indicators
ϕTi (t) T ∈ {P, Rp, Rn} denotes the MCP of power / positive reserve /negative
reserve at node i at time t. ybi j is the bid acceptance indicator of the standard bid of
type b ∈B (see eq. 1), corresponding to j-th such bid of node i. ybi j ∈ {0,1} in the
case of fill-or-kill bids.
3.1.3 Variables Corresponding to Discounts/Surpluses of Combined Bids
In the proposed model, while the standard bids are characterized by price per unit
(PPU) bid prices and cleared based on MCP values represented by the variables
ϕ , the combined bids are characterized by the package price – in other words total
maximal/minimal payoffs (regarding supply and demand respectively). While the
SW in the case of the standard bids originates and may be calculated from the differ-
ence between market clearing MCPs (denoted by φ ), it is assumed that in the case
of combined bids the maximal/minimal payoffs are subject to discount and surplus,
which do also contribute to the total social welfare. W Di j and W
S
i j denote the payoff
discount of the combined demand bid j submitted in node i and the payoff surplus
of the combined supply bid j submitted in node i respectively.
3.1.4 The Full State Vector
The full state vector of the model is derived in eq. (2).
x =
[
v P Rp Rn ϕ y W
]T x ∈Rn(4T+1)+3NT+m+mDC+mSC (2)
3.2 Cost Model of the Generating Units
The total cost of operation of the jth unit in node i, denoted by CGi j is assumed to be
linear and may be derived as described in eq. (3).
CGi j =∑
t
βi jPi j(t)+αi jvi j(O) (3)
The first term describes the variable cost of production, depending on the output
level of the unit, and the second term describes the start-up cost, which is considered
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in our framework for the whole modelled period. If the unit is e.g. turned off
and on again in the analyzed time frame, it is considered as a warm start-up with
negligible cost. However, based on the introduced variables vi j(t) the warm start-up
costs may be taken into account as well, if necessary. More complex and detailed
formulations of start-up costs may be easily considered, following the methodology
of the description of these costs in unit commitment approaches [25, 26].
The total generation cost is denoted by CG and may be calculated as CG = ∑i j CGi j
3.3 Constraints
In the following subsection the constraints of the model are summarized. Most of
these constraints use auxiliary variables, which depend on the previously introduced
primary model variables and on parameters. The definition of these auxiliary vari-
ables may be found in subsection 2.6 of [24], in line with a Table in Appendix A,
which summarizes their notations.
3.3.1 Constraints corresponding to the range of variables
These constraints described in eq. (4) that power and reserves may be allocated only
to active units, considering maximal and minimal output levels
Pi j(t)+Rpi j(t)≤ P(i, j)vi j(t) ∀ i, j, t Pi j(t)−Rni j(t)≥ P(i, j)vi j(t) ∀ i, j, t (4)
For acceptance indicators the inequality 0≤ y≤ 1 holds. In addition, for block bids
the corresponding y values are binary.
3.3.2 Bid Acceptance Constraints
1-hour bids In the case of 1-hour standard bids, the acceptance constraints are
very simple. In the case of demand bids, they describe that the corresponding indi-
cator variable ybi j ≥ 0 if and only if the difference of the bid price and the relevant
nodal price is nonnegative.
The matrix ΘDPi ∈RT×m
DP
i holds the bid PPUs of the standard power demand bids
corresponding to node i. In this matrix each column corresponds to a bid. ΘDPi (t,k)
corresponds to the price of the k-th bid in node i, regarding time period t. For a
conventional standard 1-hour bid, only one element in the corresponding column is
nonzero, and its position is the same as of the nonzero element in the corresponding
column in BDPi (the matrix holding the bid quantities). Θ
DRp
i and Θ
DRn
i correspond
to the prices of positive and negative standard demand reserve bids of node i.
In the case of 1-hour demand power bids the rules described in eq. (5) applies.
yDPik > 0 → ϕPi (trel)≤ΘDPi (trel ,k) ∀k, i, yDPik < 1 → ϕPi (trel)≥ΘDPi (trel ,k) ∀k, i
(5)
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where trel corresponds to the (relevant) time period, where the power demand cor-
responding quantity to yDPik is nonzero, which equals to the index of the nonzero
element in the column vector BDPi (.,k) of the matrix B
DP
i .
Similarly, in the case of 1-hour supply power bids, eq (6) applies.
ySPik > 0 → ϕPi (trel)≥ΘSPi (trel ,k) ∀k, i, ySPik < 1 → ϕPi (trel)≤ΘSPi (trel ,k) ∀k, i
(6)
For the 1-hour positive/negative reserve demand/supply bids similar constraints may
be derived mutatis mutandis.
Block bids In the case of multiple-hour standard bids (block bids) first the SW
value of the bid is defined (denoted by Ψ). In the case of demand bids, if the j-th
bid of node i is a block bid, ΨDPi j may be calculated as described in eq. (7).
ΨDPi j =∑
t
ΨDPi j (t) Ψ
DP
i j (t) =
(
BDPi (t, j) · (θDPi (t, j)−ϕPi (t))
)
(7)
The corresponding constraint describes that if the block bid is accepted, its SW
is positive: yDPi j = 1 → ΨDPi j > 0 Again, for the positive/negative reserve de-
mand/supply block bids (if such bids are present), similar constraints may be derived
mutatis mutandis.
Other bids For other (combined and FP) bids, the model includes no explicit
acceptance constraints, these bids are accepted or rejected by the clearing algorithm
in order to maximize the total SW.
3.3.3 Constraints Corresponding to Power and Reserve Balances
Global balances The global power balance equation is described in eq. (8).
DP(t)−SPFQ(t) = P(t) =∑
i
Pi(t) ∀t (8)
Regarding reserves, the total positive and negative reserve deficit by FQ bids must
not exceed the potential maximal positive and negative reserve production by FP
bids, as detailed in eq. (9).
DRp(t)−SRpFQ(t)≤∑SRpFP(t) ∀t, DRn(t)−SRnFQ(t)≤∑SRnFP(t) ∀t (9)
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Global combined balances Since maximal power and nonzero positive reserve
can not be allocated to any block in the same time, the sum of the net power deficit
from FQ bids and the net positive reserve deficit from FQ bids must not exceed the
maximal power amount which can be produced by the FP bids, as described in eq.
(10).
DP(t)−SPFQ(t)+DRp(t)−SRpFQ(t)≤∑SPFT (t) ∀t (10)
Similarly, the sum of the net power deficit and the net negative reserve deficit from
FQ bids must be greater than the minimal amount which can be produced by the FP
bids,as described in eq. (11).
DP(t)−SPFQ(t)− (DRn(t)−SRnFQ(t))≥∑SPFT (t) (11)
3.3.4 Network Constraints
Although several new results are available today on the topic of capacity enhance-
ment of transmission networks [27], grid bottlenecks still pose a significant limiting
factor for electricity trade.
Nominal Case It is assumed that the constraints corresponding to the transmission
network connecting the nodes are linear (consider e.g. a DC load flow approach),
thus may be written in the form of eq. (12)
Anetq(t)≤ bnet where Anet = EDFT E+ (12)
In eq. (12), F ∈ RN×K is the node-branch incidence matrix of the network (K
denotes the number of lines, while N is the number of nodes). E ∈ RN×N denotes
the susceptance matrix whose elements are Ekl = −Ykl for the off-diagonal terms
and
Ekk =−∑
l 6=k
Ekl
(the column sum of off-diagonals) for diagonal elements. Ykl denotes the admittance
of the line between nodes k and l. E+ is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of E,
and ED is a diagonal matrix with EDkk = Yi j. The above formulation may be derived
from the phase-angle approach described in [28] via the expression of the phase-
angle vector as described in [29]. For further information on DC load flow models,
see [28] and [30].
The vector bnet corresponds to the maximal power flow values of the lines. q(t) ∈
RN is the nominal power injection vector resulting from the market clearing. Its
elements are corresponding to the power imbalances (= physical power injections)
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in each node. The ith element of q(t), denoted by qi(t) corresponding to the power
injection in node i may be written as in eq. (13)
qi(t) = S
PFQ
i (t)+Pi(t)−DPi (t) where Pi(t) =∑
j
Pi j(t) (13)
Furthermore, according to the assumption regarding the lossless property of the
network, which is usual in DC load flow models, ∑i qi(t) = 0 ∀t.
Perturbed Case If consumers in a network deviated from the forecasted sched-
ule [31], and the allocated reserves must be activated to correct the imbalance, the
network constraints must hold as well. If (positive) reserves are activated in a node,
e.g. because of an unpredicted increase in the demand, the activation of the reserve
has no consequences for the network. However it is possible that the cause of re-
serve activation is in another node. This scenario may be considered as a perturbed
power injection vector qˆ(t), for which the network must be also stable, as described
by eq. (14)
Anet qˆ(t)≤ bnet ∀qˆ(t)∀t whereqˆ(t) = q(t)+δ (t) (14)
where δ (t) ∈ RN is the perturbation vector, describing reserve activation. It is
assumed that reserves may be activated at only one node in the same time, but
in this case all of the allocated reserves (described by the total reserve demand
DRpi (t)/D
Rn
i (t)) are activated. Furthermore, in our model – as ∑qi(t) = 0 – the
activated reserve must appear in a different node of the network with opposite sign
(as the cause of the imbalance). Formally, regarding the i-th element of the vector
δ
(!∃ i)
(
δi(t) ∈ {DRpi (t),DRni (t)}
)
(!∃ j 6= i) (δ j(t) =−δi(t)) (15)
where !∃ i stands for ’there exists a unique i’.
3.3.5 Scheduling Constraints
Load gradient constraints may be formulated similar to unit commitment approaches,
considering the possible activation of the allocated reserves as well, as described in
eq. (16).
(Pi j(t+1)+Rpi j(t+1))− (Pi j(t)−Rni j(t))< RUi j ∀ t < T
(Pi j(t)+Rpi j(t))− (Pi j(t+1)−Rni j(t+1))< RDi j ∀ t < T (16)
where RUi j and RDi j are the ramp-up and ramp-down constraints of the j-th unit in
node i respectively.
In addition, based on the introduced v activity variables, constraints corresponding
to minimal up and down times may be derived in the same way as in unit commit-
ment approaches [25, 26] if necessary.
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3.3.6 Income and Cost Constraints
First, the total income (I) from the demand bids must be at least equal to the cost
of supply bids (C): C ≤ I. Furthermore, the income of generating units must cover
their production costs, as described in eq. (17).
CGi j ≤ KFPi j ∀(i, j) (i ∈ {1, ..N})( j ∈ {1, ...ni}) (17)
where KFPi j is the payoff of the j-th generating unit in node i. The exact formula for
its calculation may be found in subsection 2.6.2 of [24].
Distribution of discounts and surpluses among combined bids As foreshad-
owed, the objective of the clearing model is the maximization of total SW. The SW
contribution of the standard bids may be calculated from MCPs, bid PPUs, and bid
amounts. The SW contribution of FP bids is considered as the difference between
their payoff (KFPi j ) and their generating cost (C
G
i j ). The variables W
D and W S rep-
resent the payoff discount and payoff surplus assigned to the submitted combined
bids. These variables may be viewed as follows. If all income from the accepted
demand bids is collected, and all costs regarding the supply bids are paid (includ-
ing FP and combined bids as well), thanks to the model constraints there will be
a nonnegative residual, which may be divided among the accepted combined bids
as payoff discounts or surpluses. This distribution is based on a weighting of the
combined bids, based on their average PPU, as detailed in subsection 2.7.6 of [24].
3.4 The Objective Function
The objective function of the model is to maximize the total SW, denoted by Ψ
which can be written as
Ψ=ΨDP +ΨSP +ΨDRp +ΨSRp +ΨDRn +ΨSRnKFP−CG +∑W
ΨDPi (t) =
(
BDPi (t, .) (θDPi (t, .)−ϕPi (t))
)
yDPi
ΨSPi (t) =
(
BSPi (t, .) (ϕPi (t)−θSPi (t, .))
)
ySPi
ΨDRpi (t) =
(
BDRpi (t, .) (θDRpi (t, .)−ϕRpi (t))
)
yDRpi
ΨSRpi (t) =
(
BSRpi (t, .) (ϕRpi (t)−θSRpi (t, .))
)
ySRpi
ΨDRni (t) =
(
BDRni (t, .) (θDRni (t, .)−ϕRni (t))
)
yDRni
ΨSRni (t) =
(
BSRni (t, .) (ϕRni (t)−θSRni (t, .))
)
ySRni
(18)
where the notation  stands for the element-wise multiplication, and the notation
θDPi (t, .)−ϕPi (t) stands for a vector, resulting from the element-wise subtraction of
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the scalar ϕPi (t) from the vector θDPi (t, .). In this formulation, regarding ΨDPi (t) the
accepted hourly and block bids are considered together. The notation is similar in
the case of ΨSPi (t).
4 Discussion
4.1 Computational Aspects
The balances and constraints for power and reserves described in subsection 3.3.3
are linear in the variables and do not pose a serious computational obstacle. Net-
work constraints described in subsection 3.3.4, scheduling constraints discussed in
subsection 3.3.5 are also linear. In the following, less straightforward constraints
are discussed: On the one hand on acceptance constraints derived from logical ex-
pressions (implications), and on the other hand on constraints involving quadratic
terms of the variables.
4.1.1 Bid Acceptance Constraints
It is well known that in a combinatorial optimization framework logical expressions
may be formulated in the terminology of computational constraints (see e.g. [32]).
Bid acceptance constraints for FQ bids may be formulated with the application of
auxiliary binary variables and the so called bigM method.
Let us consider the constraints described by eq. (5), with a shorter notation
y > 0 → ϕ ≤Θ y < 0 → ϕ ≥Θ (19)
where y is the bid acceptance indicator, ϕ is the MCP and Θ is the bid price. The
formulation is equivalent to
ϕ >Θ → y = 1 ϕ >Θ → y = 0 (20)
The former part of eq. (20) may be formulated as
ϕ−ϕz≤Θ − y1− (1− z)≤−1 (21)
where z is an auxiliary binary variable and ϕ is the upper bound for the MCP (the
bigM in other words).
Regarding the acceptance rule of block bids, the respective constraints may be sim-
ilarly formulated.
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4.1.2 Constraints Corresponding to Combined Bids
The equation describing the distribution of surpluses and discounts of combined
bids (eq. 63 in [24]) holds products of a binary and a continuous variables (y and W
respectively). If upper and lower bounds are assumed for W (denoted by W and W
respectively, from which W is potentially 0), and the auxiliary variable ζ = yW is
defined for each product of this type, the expression ζ = yW may be linearized as
ζ ≤Wy ζ ≥Wy
ζ ≤W −W (1− y) ζ ≥W −W (1− y) (22)
As potentially the number of combined bids is low in the market, such a linear
reformulation implies a relatively low number of additional auxiliary variables (ζ -
s), so it is generally advised.
4.1.3 Constraints Describing Minimum Income Conditions
Probably the most difficult elements of the proposed formulation are the minimum
income conditions described in eq. (17), which include the terms KFPi , the payoff of
flexible production bids. These are composed of quadratic expressions holding the
product of continuous variables: The MCP’s for power and reserves (ϕPi , ϕ
Rp
i , ϕ
Rn
i )
and power/reserve production quantities (Pi, j, Rpi, j, Rni, j) – thus they are a critical
point regarding computational issues. If such flexible-production units and con-
straints are present, the implied problem falls into the class of non-convex quadrat-
ically constrained quadratic (QCQP) programs. The more recent advances on such
problems are described in [33]. Further papers discuss the possible approaches for
this problem class, as exact quadratic convex reformulation [34] or piecewise linear
and edge-concave relaxations [35]. Results corresponding to general non-convex
mixed-integer nonlinear problems are surveyed in [36].
Despite the recent advances described in [33], QCQP is still considered as a hard
problem class, for which large-scale implementations pose a significant challenge.
Regarding this issue, let us however recite the consideration described in [9], namely
that it is likely that steady progress in computing technologies could well curb the
above difficulties within the coming years.
4.2 Prospects for Generalizations
How the proposed model could be generalized for the procurement of multiple (i.e.
secondary and tertiary) reserves simultaneously is a straightforward question. In
the context of the described framework, tertiary reserves would mean reserves with
higher response time, but otherwise they are considered as the reserves discussed
before (capacity allocation payment is assumed). Such an extension is possible,
however it would significantly increase the complexity of the model.
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Naturally, in such a framework regarding one-hour and multiple hour single product
bids the secondary (S) and tertiary (T) reserves must be distinguished, as well as the
MCPs for which additional variables shall be defined. Regarding FP bids, instead
the variables Rp and Rn similar variables as RSp, RSn, RT p RT n should be used
corresponding to allocated amounts of secondary and tertiary reserves. Addition
parameters (maximally allocated S and T type reserves must be also considered).
Additional constraints in this case have be included to describe the asymmetry of
substitution relations – e.g. the sum of allocated S and T type reserves for any hour
must not exceed the maximal amount of T type reserve which may be allocated, and
so on. Ramp limits of the units must be considered to formulate such constraints.
The combined bids would be the least problematic elements in this framework. they
only have to be extended with an amount regarding T type reserves, but every other
aspects of them may stay the same.
Auxiliary variables of course must be updated/extended as well (e.g. the total net
demand for S and T type reserves must be distinguished, etc.). Constraints corre-
sponding to the range of variables must be updated, as the sum of allocated power,
S and T type of positive reserves must not exceed the maximal production value P
(and mutatis mutandis in the case of P). Balances must be updated as well. Inequal-
ities 9 must be formulated distinctly for S and T type reserves, and global combined
balances (eq. 10) also have to be updated.
Network constraints in this case must consider perturbed power injection vectors
corresponding to the activation of tertiary reserves as well. Load gradient constraints
must be formulated considering both types of reserve, and naturally the income and
cost constraints must me modified as well to account for the now product type. In
the objective function, the new terms corresponding to T type reserve bids must be
included.
5 Conclusions
The formulation of SW based simultaneous clearing methods for power and ancil-
lary services is a complex task even in the case when the network constraints are
neglected. In the current paper a market coupling approach of integrated power-
reserve markets including innovative orders is proposed, which could help the effi-
cient bidding of generating units and by adding additional bidding alternatives make
the market more flexible. In addition the proposed formulation also includes net-
work constraints for the nominal (or undisturbed) case and also considers scenarios
when the reserves are activated. The described approach results in a computation-
ally hard, but likely not out-of reach problem.
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